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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/appellee

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

V.

Case No. 20010514-CA

VICTOR MANUEL RODRIGUEZ
Defendant/appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken as a result of the plain error of the Honorable Judith Atherton,
in taking the guilty plea of Rodriguez, by failing to comply with Rule 11 of Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Alternatively this Court has jurisdiction under the exceptional
circumstances exception.
Final judgment in this case was rendered on May 18, 2001 when Rodriguez was
sentenced by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. Notice of appeal was timely filed on
June 12, 2001. A motion to withdraw the plea was not timely made at the trial court
1

level. Notwithstanding Rodriguez's failure to timely file a motion to withdraw his plea
this Court "can review a plain error claim based on a violation of Rule 11." State v. Melo,
V 2001 UT.App. 392.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
L

Whether or not the trial court committed plain error when it improperly entered the
plea affidavit on the record?

II.

Whether or not the trial court committed plain error when it relied exclusively on
the plea affidavit to "advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as
to sentence is not binding on the cour?" Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
11(g)(2).

HI.

Whether or not Rodriguez's plea was knowing and voluntary and taken in
compliance with Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11?

IV.

Whether the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11(e)(3) when it informed
Rodriguez he had the right to "bring" witnesses instead of informing him of his
right to "compel" witnesses to come to court?

V.

Whether Rodriguez's constitutional rights of equal protection and due process
were violated when his right to withdraw his guilty plea were cut off before any
defects in his plea became apparent?
For each of the issues listed above the standard of appellate review is the

following: "The ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied with
2

constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law
that is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower court's conclusions of
law." State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528 (Utah 200i)(Ostler II).
None of these issues were preserved in the trial court1. Rodriguez asserts the
issues above are a result of "plain error" on the part of the trial judge, or in the alternative,
exceptional circumstances, and as such may be raised for the first time on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The interpretation of Utah Criminal Rules of Procedure 11 (g)(2) and Section 7713-6 of the Utah Code, are of central importance to this case and are set out verbatim
below:
Rule 11(g)(2) states "If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the
court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
*Due to the then existing state of the law, Rodriguez had only thirty days from the
entry of his plea to move for withdrawal of his plea. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,
1067 (Utah 1993). Since he entered his plea on March 27, 2001, he would have had to
move for withdrawal of his plea on or about April 26, 2001, in order to be timely.
However, Rodriguez did not become aware of defects in his plea until May 18, 2001, the
day he was sentenced, twenty two days after the deadline expired. Ostler //which
clarified that the thirty days begins to run from the date of sentencing was filed on August
10, 2001, approximately two months too late to be of use to Rodriguez. The record does
reflect that a motion to set aside guilty plea was held and argued on October 17, 2001,
however, the hearing was in regard to issuance of a certificate of probable cause. The
trial court, reading between the lines, denied Rodriguez's motion to set aside the guilty
plea. In any event, it is clear from the case law, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
even hear a motion to set aside a guilty plea, as no motions were filed within 30 days of
the entry of the guilty plea, or even with 30 days of the sentencing, which could be
ostensibly be construed as a motion to withdraw the plea.
3

binding on the court."
Utah Code Section 77-13-6 states:
(1) a plea of not guilty may he withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion
and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Victof Rodriguez appeals from his conviction following his entry of a guilty plea
to Unlawful possession of a Controlled Substance or Counterfeit Substance with Intent to
Distribute, Cocaine, a Second Degree Felony, which crime allegedly took place on
January 18, 2001. Rodriguez entered his guilty plea to the charge on March 27, 2001.
On May 18, 2001 Rodriguez was before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, for
sentencing. After reviewing the pre-sentence report and statements of the prosecutor and
defense counsel, Rodriguez was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A review of the change of plea hearing shows that Rodriguez has difficulty
understanding English, and that a Spanish translator was present to assist Rodriguez.
4

Notwithstanding the translator's assistance, Rodriguez continued to have difficulty
understanding the questions from the bench (Plea at 6).
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor, Mr. Sheffield, in response to the court
ordering a pre-sentence report, said "our recommendation is that he spend 30 days and be
deported." (Plea at 9 (emphasis added)). Defense counsel apparently believed that a presentence report would be necessary. Id. The judge responded by saying: "Mr. Rodriguez,
it's been brought to my attention that part of the recommendation will be that at
sentencing you will be permitted to be deported from the United States. That's not
something I am going to address today, but, certainly, it is something that the sentencing
judge will address." (Plea at 10 (emphasis added)). No further statements were made
with respect to the recommendation. The guilty plea was entered, the plea affidavit was
signed and incorporated into the record with a finding by the judge that "the plea [was]
knowing, intelligent and voluntary today." (Plea at 11). No finding with respect to the
plea affidavit was made.
At the sentencing hearing, no specific sentencing recommendation was made by
the State. After a statement by defense counsel, recommending "local jail and
deportation," (Plea at 4) the judge sentenced Rodriguez to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State
Prison. No sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor's office appeared in the presentence report.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
5

Rodriguez asserts that he was wrongfully induced to plead guilty by either, in the
worst case scenario, beijig led to believe he would thereby receive thirty days of jail
followed by deportation, or at a minimum, being allowed to believe that would be his
sentence. This unfortunate misunderstanding could have been prevented if the trial court
had properly used the multiple safeguards at its disposal, namely, the plea affidavit, and
the Rule 11 colloquy.
However, the trial court incorporated the plea affidavit, without reviewing all of
the statements therein, shortly after an important sentencing issue had been raised,
creating considerable confusion in the court room. The incorporation of the plea affidavit
was improper at that point, and is not properly part of the record. Had Rodriguez read
and understood the affidavit, he would have been forewarned of the possible
consequences of entering his plea.
The trial court further disregarded Rule 11(g)(2) which requires the judge to
personally advise a defendant that sentencing recommendations are not binding on the
judge. A plea affidavit cannot fulfil that "personal" duty of the court. Had the judge
"personally" advised Rodriguez he might have understood he could truly receive 1 to 15
years, instead of the 30 days followed by deportation recommended by the prosecutor.
Since Rodriguez did not appreciate the value, or rather lack of value, of the
sentencing recommendation, his plea cannot be said to have knowing or voluntary, and as
such it must be allowed to be withdrawn.
6

Additionally, the judge erred in that, when advising Rodriguez of his constitutional
rights stated incorrectly that he could "bring" witnesses to testify on his behalf, rather
than using the proper word "compel." Although the difference of meaning between the
two words is minimal, comments with respect to constitutional rights must be given the
utmost solicitude the court is capable of, and Rodriguez technically was not aware of his
right to "compel" witnesses to testify on his behalf.
Finally, Rodriguez failed to move for withdrawal his guilty plea after the above
defects were discovered due to the then existing state of the law, requiring him to
withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days of the plea colloquy. That cut off date deprived
Rodriguez of equal protection and due process of law. However, this appeal, when taken
as a whole, is a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, at the time filed in the only court with
jurisdiction to hear the motion, this Court. This appeal was timely filed, within 30 days
of sentencing, and could conceivably be considered a timely motion to withdraw
Rodriguez's plea. Such withdrawal should be allowed so as to not deprive Rodriguez of
his rights.

ARGUMENT
Introduction

7

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERRORS BY NOT COMPLYING
WITH RULE 11 AND BY NOT COMPLYING WITH MAGUIRE'S REQUIREMENTS
FOR INCORPORATING PLEA AFFIDAVITS ON THE RECORD
Rodriguez asserts that each of the issues raised below may be raised for the first
time on appeal through the "plain error" doctrine.
The case law is well established regarding grounds for seeking review of issues not
preserved in the trial court:
It is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails to bring an issue
before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on
appeal. However, three exceptions to this general rule are recognized in
Utah. An appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if
appellant establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," if there are
"exceptional circumstances," or in some situations, if a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised on appeal even though, by reason of the
claimed ineffectiveness, the matter was not raised below.
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (citations omitted). Rodriguez asserts
that the issues raised above are the product of plain error and exceptional circumstances.
"In order to obtain relief through the doctrine of 'plain error' an appellant must
establish that '(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful' If appellant fails to prove one of these requirements, plain
error is not established." Irwin at 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Notwithstanding Rodriguez's failure to timely file a
motion to withdraw his plea this Court "can review a plain error claim based on a
violation of Rule 11." State v. Melo, f7 2001 UT.App. 392. In order to avoid duplicity,

%

plain error analysis will follow at the end of each argument.
ARGUMENT ONE
THE PLEA AFFIDAVIT WAS IMPROPERLY ACCEPTED AS PART OF THE
RECORD AS THE RECORD DOES NOT REFLECT THAT THE AFFIDAVIT WAS
READ, UNDERSTOOD AND ACKNOWLEDGED BY RODRIGUEZ
Although this issue was not preserved in the trial court, this Court may review this
issue under the plain error doctrine, provided this Court finds plain error exists.
A properly executed plea affidavit to be incorporated into the record must (1) "be
addressed during the plea hearing"; (2) "The trial court must conduct an inquiry to
establish that the defendant understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it"; (3) "Any
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as
must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. State v. Maguire, 830
P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App.
1991)). "Then the affidavit itself, signed by the required parties . . . can be incorporated
into the record." Id. See State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334-35 (Utah App. 1989)
(per curiam) ("incomplete affidavit coupled with inquiry only into understanding and
voluntariness fails to meet Gibbons Rule 11 requirements"). Only after these
requirements have been met can the affidavit properly become part of the record. Failure
to meet these requirements will result, in many cases, in a failure to satisfy Rule 11.
1) Was the affidavit addressed during the plea hearing?
The first requirement was met by the trial court, the affidavit was addressed
9

during the plea hearing, but the references to the affidavit are quite obscure (Plea at 6,
10). Initially the court addressed the affidavit by saying "Were you able to review a
statement of the constitutional rights you give up with your attorney?" (Plea at 3). Later
the court stated: "I spoke with you a few moments ago, and you indicated you had
reviewed a statement of your constitutional rights, but you felt like you needed more time
to speak with your attorney." (Plea at 6). The only other reference to the affidavit during
the plea colloquy, is when the court said: "Okay. I'll ask you to sign that statement... I
have before me a statement signed by Defendant..." (Plea at 10).
2) Did the trial court's inquiry establish that Rodriguez understood the affidavit
and voluntarily signed it?
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, but an
affidavit should be only the starting point, not an end point, in the pleading
process.. . . The trial judge should then review the statements in the
affidavit with the defendant, question the defendant concerning his
understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by [Rule 11]
on the record before accepting the guilty plea.
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). This is what has
become known as the "strict compliance" approach. On its face, Gibbons would require
a trial judge to review all of the statements contained in an affidavit with the defendant
before accepting it and incorporating it on the record.
Maguire interpreting Gibbons quoted Smith for the proposition that "the trial court
must conduct an inquiry to establish the defendant understands the affidavit and
voluntarily signed it." Maguire at 217. An inquiry was made by the judge with respect to

10

Rodriguez's understanding of his constitutional rights, but the record is devoid of any
inquiry regarding Rodriguez's understanding of the affidavit. The only question that
could possibly shed light on Rodriguez's understanding of the affidavit is hopelessly
vague at best. The court asked: "Do you feel like you have spoken to [your attorney]
enough this afternoon?" (Plea at 6). "Because of the importance of compliance with
Boykin, the law placed the burden of establishing compliance with those requirements on
the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their
clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit." Gibbons at 1313. In fact the judge
made no finding as to Mr. Rodriguez's understanding of the affidavit nor as to his
voluntariness in signing it. The only finding the judge made was with respect to Mr.
Rodriguez's plea, not the affidavit. (Plea at 11). The judge did not meet her burden.
The Utah Supreme Court in Maguire recognized that an affidavit may properly
become part of the record when "the record reflects [it] was read, understood, and
acknowledged by defendant and the court" Maguire at 218 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, an affidavit can only be incorporated into the record after "the defendant
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the information contained therein." Id.
at 217 (emphasis added).
There is no indication on the record that the court "read" or "understood" the
affidavit. There is indication, however, that neither the court nor Mr. Rodriguez read the
affidavit, as is evidenced by the incomplete information in paragraph 14 of the plea

11

affidavit, which fails to state whether the plea of guilty is or is not the result of a plea
bargain. Had either party read paragraph 14, it should have been properly completed.
The result is that the record reflects one of the following: 1) the affidavit was not read; or
2) the affidavit was, at least in part, not understood. Either of these conclusions would
support the finding that the affidavit was improperly included as part of the record.
Abyeta further illuminates the Maguire test, stating that the record may include
documents that "have been properly incorporated, and it is clear that they are indeed part
of the defendant's knowledge and understanding." State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996
(Utah 1993). Based on the record it is clear that the affidavit was not properly
incorporated; and it is likewise unclear whether the information contained therein was
part of Mr. Rodriguez's "knowledge and understanding." Once again the affidavit
should be excluded.
Abeyta cautions "[t]rial courts may use a plea affidavit to facilitate the taking of a
plea, but a trial judge cannot discharge his legal duty merely by accepting such an
affidavit with the defendant's acknowledgment that he executed it and that the affidavit
is true." Abeyta, at 996 (Stewart, J. concurring). The court, in the case at bar, went
somewhat beyond "merely accepting" the affidavit, but in light of the discrepancies
outlined above it is clear that the affidavit was improperly incorporated as part of the
record.
3) Were omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit clarified, together with any
uncertainties raised in the plea colloquy?
12

"Any omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea
hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy. Then the
affidavit itself, signed by the required parties . . . can be incorporated into the record."
Maguire at 217-18.
One omission has been pointed out above, that omission being with respect to
paragraph 14 of the plea affidavit. That paragraph currently reads "My plea(s) of guilty
(is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain . .." Which is it? Is or is not? Certainly Mr.
Rodriguez, his attorney, and the court all failed to cross out either "(is)" or "(is not)".
According to Maguire, this omission or ambiguity must have been clarified during the
plea hearing. Since it was not, the affidavit should not have been incorporated into the
record. Id.
Another uncertainty was raised during the colloquy, but never clarified. The
uncertainty arose when the prosecutor stated "I thought it was a plead and deport. I
didn't see any reason for a pre-sentence report, because our recommendation is that he
spend 30 days and be deported." (Plea at 9 (emphasis added)). The trial court's
response was "Mr. Rodriguez, it's been brought to my attention that part of the
recommendation will be that at sentencing you will be permitted to be deported from the
United States. That's not something I am going to address today, but, certainly, it is
something that the sentencing judge will address."(Plea at 10 (emphasis added)).
Curiously, the trial court addressed the issue of the sentencing recommendation by
13

explicitly stating "you will be permitted to be deported" but that she was not "going to
address [that] today." Id. The contradictory statements of the judge, first ostensibly
stating that stating that Rodriguez would be deported, then stating that she was
specifically not addressing that issue, created an inherently confusing atmosphere, one in
which Rodriguez was lead to believe he would be deported. Maguire clearly states "any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy" "must be clarified during the plea
hearing" before "the affidavit. . . can be incorporated into the record." Maguire at 21718. The uncertainty with respect to the recommendation was never clarified, and the
affidavit was therefore improperly incorporated into the record. Id.
The State may argue that the affidavit itself clarifies the value of the sentencing
recommendation. However, that would be placing the cart before the horse, as the
affidavit can only be incorporated after all uncertainties in the plea colloquy are clarified.
Id.
Aside from the duty to clarify uncertainties, the trial judge failed to follow Rule
11(g)(2) as outlined to a greater extent in Argument Two, below. Had she done so, the
uncertainty would have been clarified.
Plain Error Analysis
1) Does an error exist?
Clearly an error exists, as the plea affidavit should not have been incorporated into
the record until after the trial court had established that Rodriguez and the court had: 1)

14

read and understood all the information contained in the affidavit, and 2) clarified any
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit or any uncertainties raised in the course of the
plea colloquy. Maguire at 217-18. The record and the affidavit establish the contrary,
namely that all the information was not read by either the court or Rodriguez, as is
explained above, and the uncertainties with respect to the sentencing recommendation
was not clarified.
2) Should the error have been obvious to the trial court?
In light of the numerous cases at the Supreme Court and Appellate Court levels
that have explained the proper use of plea affidavits, this error should have been obvious
to any trial judge, and particularly to the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, as she personally
argued Maguire while at the Attorney General's Office.
3) Is the error harmful?
The error is extremely harmful as Rodriguez was led to believe, by both the
prosecutor and the judge, that he would receive as his sentence, thirty days in jail,
followed by deportation. (Plea at 9-10.) With that belief firmly in mind, he plead guilty,
ultimately receiving an indeterminate term in Prison of one to fifteen years.
ARGUMENT TWO
THE PLEA AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DISCHARGE THE COURT'S DUTY TO
PERSONALLY ADVISE MR. RODRIGUEZ OF THE NON-BINDING NATURE OF
THE PROSECUTION'S RECOMMENDATION
Rule 11(g)(2) states that "If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court,

15

the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is
not binding on the court." (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has never had
occasion to interpret that particular phrase; however, it has used similar language in
various cases. State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Utah 1986) ("In addition, the court
must inform the defendant it is not bound by the prosecutor's agreement to request or
recommend a specific sentence"); Gibbons 2d at 1314 ("If recommendations as to
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court"). Smith, although decided
before Maguire, puts this requirement in the proper perspective. It stated "the court need
not repeat, verbatim, Rule 11 inquires . . . unless Rule 11 by its terms specifically
requires such repetition.... E.g., Rule 1 l(7)(b) [providing that the] court 'shall advise
the defendant personally' as to non-binding nature of plea agreement." Smith, at 477.
Despite the clear language of the rule, and the various admonitions of the courts listed
above using similar if not identical language, the plea transcripts are void of any personal
advisement to the defendant by the court thcit the sentencing recommendations were not
binding on the sentencing judge. Rule 11 has therefore been violated, and must be
remedied.
If a defendant is not informed that the a recommendation is not binding, that may
be grounds for reversal of the plea. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1276 (Utah 1988)
(holding that the defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea, if it were found,
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upon remand, that the defendant understood the promise of the prosecutor to be a
sentence in a hospital without knowing that the promise was without value.); State v.
Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that "[t]he court may not
accept a guilty plea until it has advised the defendant personally that any sentencing
recommendation he or she may have agreed upon with the prosecution is not binding on
the court.55).
The judge never advised Rodriguez that the court was not bound to follow the
sentencing recommendation. The vague statement by the judge at the plea hearing that
"At sentencing the judge will be the person who determines the type of sentence you
receive55 even coupled with the earlier statement that the sentencing could consist of a
maximum sentence of one to fifteen years does not equate to advising the defendant that
the court was not bound by the plea. (Plea at 9) See Smith (holding that "[t]he
requirement that the court 'advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as
to sentence is not binding on the court5 was met when the court specifically explained
that the state could only recommend, but not guarantee, that defendant not be
incarcerated.55) The court never stated that the prosecution could 'only recommend, but
not guarantee5 a sentence, nor did the court use any language remotely similar which
might have alerted Mr. Rodriguez of his peril. In fact, the issue was specifically not
addressed. (Plea transcript, p. 9,1. 4-6). This is particularly true when those statements
were made before the sentencing recommendation was made, as the recommendation
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logically had the tendency of negating the judge's earlier comments.
Still the judge did nothing to bolster her previous statements, but instead said "you
will be permitted to be deported." (Plea at 10). Admittedly those words are taken out of
context2, but it is the natural tendency for people to hear words that confirm their beliefs.
Those words did precisely that, confirmed Rodriguez's belief he would be deported.
Due to the court's failure to inform Mr. Rodriguez as to the value, or rather the lack of
value, of the prosecutor's recommendation, the Defendant was left with the assumption
that he would serve thirty days and then be deported.
Even if the plea affidavit were properly executed and properly incorporated into
the record, the affidavit cannot substitute for a personal advisement by the court.
Gibbons at 1314 (holding that an affidavit covering the requirements of Rule 11 may be
used by the court, but the judge must still review on the record the elements contained in
the affidavit and in Rule 11 with the defendant); Abeyta at 996 (Stewart, J. concurring)
(stating that "[t]rial courts may use a plea affidavit to facilitate the taking of a plea, but a
trial judge cannot discharge his legal duty merely by accepting such an affidavit with the
defendant's acknowledgment that he executed it and that the affidavit is true."); Valencia
at 1134.

2

The entire quotation is cited above, but is listed here for convenience sake. "Mr.
Rodriguez, it's been brought to my attention that part of the recommendation will be that
at sentencing you will be permitted to be deported form the United States. That is not
something I am going to address today, but, certainly it is something that the sentencing
judge will address." (Plea at 10.)
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The statute explicitly states that "the court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court." Rule 11(g)(2)
(emphasis added). "When interpreting a statute, this court will not look beyond the
statute's plain language unless the plain language is ambiguous." State v. All Real
Property, f 8 (Utah App.Ct. 2001). Since the statute is plain and unambiguous, the
question becomes: what does "personally" mean?
The plain meaning of "personally" suggests the court must advise the defendant
orally, not through an impersonal affidavit. In reviewing statutes, courts must "look to
the plain meaning of the language [of the statute] to discern the legislative intent." Chris
& Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm% 791 P.2d 511,513 (Utah 1990) (citing
Allisen v. Am. Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)). The dictionary
definition, and thus the plain meaning, of "personally" is "In a personal manner; by
bodily presence; in person; not by representative or substitute; as, to deliver a letter
personally." Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, © 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc.
Another leading dictionary defines it as "Without the intervention of another; in person: /
thanked them personally•." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
Fourth Edition. Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
The word "personally" in this subsection sets it apart from other requirements of
Rule 11, requiring by its own terms an "in person" or "by bodily presence" advisement
by the court. An employer who terminates an employee through a pink slip or a written
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letter cannot be said to have "personally" fired that employee. A defendant who is
required to "personally" appear in court cannot satisfy that requirement by sending a
letter to the court or even by sending a representative. Likewise, a judge required to
"personally advise" a defendant cannot do so with an affidavit.
It is clear from the case law, that certain requirements of Rule 11 may generally be
satisfied by a properly incorporated plea affidavit. See supra. However, courts have
consistently carved out an exception to that rule when Rule 11, by its own terms compels
action. Smith supra. If any of the requirements of Rule 11 are required to be
administered by the court through a colloquy at the plea hearing, Rule 11(g)(2) must be
included among them.
Plain Error Analysis
1) Does an error exist?
It is clear that an error exists as Rodriguez was never verbally advised by the court
as to the non-binding nature of sentencing recommendations, as is required by Rule
11(g)(2). Such failure constitutes an error.
2) Should the error have been obvious to the trial court?
Due to the lack of ambiguity of Rule 11(g)(2), it should have been obvious to the
trial court that this particular requirement could not be satisfied through the use of a plea
affidavit. What else could "personally advise" mean, other than some verbal comment
from the bench informing Rodriguez that the recommendation was not binding? The
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dicta in the cases above supports that conclusion. See supra.
3) Is the error harmful?
The error is extremely harmful to Rodriguez as he may never have entered his
guilty plea if he understood he might be sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison. He
may well have elected to take his chances in open court, rather than skip directly to
sentencing. However, the recommendation and belief that he would receive thirty days,
followed by deportation, induced him to enter his guilty plea.
ARGUMENT THREE
RODRIGUEZ'S GUILTY PLEA WAS TAKEN INVOLUNTARILY AND
UNKNOWINGLY AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11, AS SUCH MUST
BE PERMITTED TO BE WITHDRAWN
In order for a plea of guilty to be upheld, Rule 11 must be strictly followed. State
v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (holding that strict compliance of Rule 11
required); Gibbons at 1312 (Utah 1987) (holding that in accepting a guilty plea the trial
court has the burden of ensuring compliance with constitutional and rule requirements);
Valencia atl334 (stating that "[s]trict, and not just substantial, compliance" of Rule
11(e)(5) is required) (citing State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988));
State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, % 10 (holding that the trial court must strictly adhere to
the rule governing guilty pleas); State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996); State
v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah App. 1990), cert deniedby 804 P.2d 123; State v.
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that "[t]he trial judge bears the
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burden of establishing, on the record, strict compliance with Rule 11(e)."))
Rule 11(e)(2) requires that the plea be made voluntarily. Utah Code Ann. § 7735-11(e)(2) (1999). A plea is not made voluntarily or knowingly unless the defendant
understands any agreements and their limitations.

Cope land at 1274; Hammond v.

United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 742, 748 (1970). A violation of Rule 11(g)(2) is also a
violation of the voluntariness requirement; thus Rule 11(g)(2) must be adhered to as
strictly as Rule 11(e). Copeland at 1274 (holding that "in order for a plea to be
voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the nature and value of
any promises made to him.").
The evidence in this regard, having already been marshaled in the Arguments
above, will not be repeated here. It is sufficient to affirm that Rodriguez was never
personally informed of the non-binding nature of the prosecutor's recommendation. See
supra. It is also important to note that the judge did find the plea to be "knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary." (Plea at 11).
Mr. Rodriguez did not understand that he was at risk of serving the maximum time
for the count he pled guilty to. The language barrier was apparent during the plea
hearing as Mr. Rodriguez could not hear everything the judge was saying because the
judge and the translator were speaking quickly and at the same time. (Plea hearing, p. 5,
1. 2-9) The greatest and most harmful misunderstanding lies in the fact that Mr.
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Rodriguez was either led to believe or, at a minimum, was allowed to believe he would
only serve thirty days then be deported. Indeed, "defendant pled with an exaggerated
belief in the benefits of his plea." Copeland at 1275 (quoting People v. Lawson, 255
N.W.2d 748, 750 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). "Since defendant surrendered his
right to trial in apparent misapprehension of the value of commitments made to him, he
should be allowed to withdraw his plea." Id. (internal quotations omitted), see also State
v. Breckenridge, 688 p.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983)(stating that "[a] guilty plea cannot be
voluntary if it is uniformed); State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989)("the record
must show that he was unequivocally and clearly informed about that sentence that
would be imposed"); Ostler I at 1J15 ("If the trial court fails to do so, the guilty plea is not
knowing and voluntarily made and must be vacated.").

Plain Error Analysis
1) Does an error exist?
An error certainly exists as Rodriguez plead with an exaggerated belief in the
value of the sentencing recommendation that was made, and the court equivocated as to
what sentence would ultimately be imposed. As such, his plea was neither knowing nor
voluntary. Id.
2) Should the error have been obvious to the trial court?
The error should have been obvious to the trial court due to the confusion at the
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hearing and the failure to strictly comply with the plain language Rule 11(g)(2), in
addition to the numerous cases cited above.
3) Was the error harmful?
The error was harmful as Rodriguez gave up his right to trial, and other
constitutional rights, due to his misplaced reliance on the value of the recommendation,
and is currently incarcerated as a result. When defendants are deprived of certain
constitutional rights it "will always invalidate the conviction." Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993). Here, Rodriguez was deprived of
virtually all his constitutional rights.
ARGUMENT FOUR
THE COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e)(3) BY ADVISING
DEFENDANT HE HAD THE RIGHT TO "BRING" WITNESSES INSTEAD OF
"COMPEL" THEM TO COME TO COURT.
"Rule 11 requires the trial court to find that seven detailed and specific criteria
have been fulfilled. Utah R.Crim.P. 11(5) (a) - (g)." Maguire at 218. It is clear that
these requirements can be met using multiple means, including a plea affidavit, properly
included on the record. Id. The pre-conditions to accepting a plea affidavit have been
discussed at length above, and will not be repeated here. However, a recent case sheds
some light on exactly how these criteria, may be fulfilled, namely: "Rule 11(e) 'requires
the trial court [during the plea colloquy] to find that seven detailed and specific criteria
have been fulfilled.9" State v. TarnawieckU 5 P.3d 1222, % 16 (Utah App. 2000)(quoting
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State v. Visser, 973 P.2d 998 (Utah App 1999) (cert, granted)) (alteration in original).
The implication here is that an affidavit will not suffice when outlining these seven
criteria, of which, this is one.
The trial court did not properly address Rule 11(e)(3) during the plea colloquy.
Rule 11(e)(3) provides that "The court... may not accept the [guilty] plea until the court
has found . . . the defendant knows of. . . the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses." Rule 11(e)(3) (emphasis added). The court stated during the plea hearing
that "You also understand that you are giving up your right... to bring your own
witnesses." Plea Hearing Transcript, p. 8 1. 6-8 (emphasis added). Because the court
only advised Mr. Rodriguez that he was giving up the right to "bring" witnesses as
opposed to the right to "compel" witnesses to attend, the rule was technically not
satisfied. A potential confusion would exist as the judge's comments and the affidavit
are at slight variance, thus making it improper to incorporate the affidavit until such time
as the confusion was eradicated. Maguire at 217-18.
Plain Error Analysis
1) Does an error exist?
An error certainly exists as Rodriguez plead guilty without fully understanding his
constitutional right to compel witnesses on his behalf. The court therefore exercised
power it did not have in accepting the plea. See Rule 11(e)(3).
2) Should the error have been obvious to the trial court?
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The error should have been obvious to the trial court due to the plain language of
Rule 11 setting forth the requirements for taking a plea, and the numerous cases cited
above interpreting those provisions.
3) Was the error harmful?
The error was harmful because Rodriguez, as a result was deprived of his
constitutional rights which "will always invalidate the conviction." Sullivan, supra.
ARGUMENT FIVE
THE THIRTY DAY TIME PERIOD TO WITHDRAW A GUILTY PLEA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
AND DUE PROCESS.
The portion of the statute limiting the time to withdraw a guilty plea to thirty days
from the date of the plea should be found unconstitutional. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-136(2)(b) (2000). The State Constitution provides for the equal protection of the people and
the right of due process of law. Utah Const, art. I., §§ 2, 7. These protections are also
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Due to the time
constraints imposed by U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b), a defendant may discover errors only
after it is too late to remedy the problem. This would be analogous to requiring a patient
to bring a medical malpractice action before the doctor's error is discovered, which would
certainly violate a patient's due process rights. Mr. Rodriguez had no idea of the errors in
his case until sentencing, which occurred fifty-two days after his plea, yet because thirty
days had past he had no recourse at the trial court level to withdraw his plea. His
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incarceration after this injustice is contrary to the Constitutional safeguards established in
the State and Federal Constitutions.
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the constitutional problems associated with
this regime stated that a defendant's "appeal rights on the plea question could be cut off
before he has even been convicted of the underlying offense. Aside from being absurd,
such a result might pose constitutional problems/' Ostler II at ^Jl0. Certainly the case at
bar is both absurd and has constitutional problems. Rodriguez did not file for withdrawal
of his guilty plea after he was sentenced in reliance on State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064
(holding that the thirty day period for withdrawal of guilty pleas is jurisdictional and runs
from the date the plea is entered)(overruled in part by Ostler II), as he was already
beyond the thirty day limitation. He also relied on the trial judge's assertion that he had
"the right to file a motion to withdraw [the plea] within 30 days of today." (Plea at 11).
He was thereby tricked, bamboozled, led astray and induced by the existing case law and
the trial judge's interpretation of the statute to file an appeal rather than making a motion
to withdraw his plea after sentence was pronounced. His constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection under the law were thereby violated.
Exceptional Circumstances
This Court will be permitted to review this claim for the first time on appeal if it
finds that exceptional circumstances exist. "[T]he exceptional circumstances exception is
ill-defined and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies." Dunn at 1209 n. 3.
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The case at bar is certainly a "rare procedural anomaly." It arose because
Rodriguez knew that he had been wronged by the system, and that his right to withdraw
the guilty plea had apparently been cut off. His only viable option at that point, based on
the case law was to file an appeal. Had Rodriguez known that Ostler //would have
allowed the trial court jurisdiction to withdraw the guilty plea, he would have filed a
motion to do so. However, left with the then current state of the law, he chose the best
option available and filed an appeal.
When taken as a whole, this appeal is in essence a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, filed in the only court that, at the time, had jurisdiction to hear the motion. As such,
it is timely under Ostler II, and should be found to be an exceptional circumstance,
allowing this Court to consider this argument for the first time on appeal.
Plain Error Analysis
In the alternative, this Court could consider the issue under a plain error analysis.
1) Does an error exist?
An error exists as Rodriguez was deprived of his constitutional rights under false
pretenses and without due process of law.
2) Should the error have been obvious to the trial court?
The error should have been obvious to the trial court as the court was well aware
that sentencing would take place more than 30 days after the entry of the plea, thus
depriving Rodriguez of the opportunity to withdraw the plea should errors become
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evident at sentencing.
3) Was the error harmful?
The error was harmful because Rodriguez, as a result, was deprived of his ability
to withdraw his guilty plea even after he realized that he had misunderstood the true
consequences of pleading guilty, and the lack of value of the sentencing
recommendation. The State got the benefit of Rodriguez's plea, but Rodriguez was left
holding the bag, with no adequate remedy in sight.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Rodriguez prays this Court:
1.

Find that the plea affidavit was improperly incorporated into the record,
constituting plain error by the trial judge, and strike it therefrom;

2.

Find that the trial judge failed to "personally advise" Rodriguez of the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation, constituting plain error,
and therefore allow him to withdraw his guilty plea;

3.

Find that Rodriguez's plea was involuntary and unknowingly taken, not in
compliance with Rule 11, constituting plain error, and therefore allow him
to withdraw his plea;

4.

Find that Rodriguez was deprived of his constitutional rights when he was
not informed he could "compel" witnesses to testify on his behalf, and
therefore allow him to withdraw his plea;
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5.

Find that the thirty day time limitation for withdrawal of Rodriguez's plea
was unconstitutional, that Rodriguez was deprived of his rights to equal
protection and due process, and that he therefore be allowed to withdraw his
plea.

6.

Or in the alternative, find that this appeal constitutes a motion for
withdrawal of guilty plea, timely filed, in the only court of proper
jurisdiction at the time, and as such allow for withdrawal of the plea.
NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

Respectfully Submitted this

day of December, 2001.

Joseph Jardine,1^
Attorney for Mr. Rodriguez
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